This paper asks what happened to racially motivated hate crimes in the wake of the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the 9/11 terror attack that hit the US in September 2001. There is anecdotal and statistical evidence of an increase in biasmotivated crimes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, but little quantitative research on the issue. This study offers empirical evidence on the effects of 7/7 and 9/11 on hate crime using rich data from four police force areas in England with sizable Asian/Arab populations. We find significant increases in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs that occurred almost immediately in the wake of both terror attacks, which subsequently decayed, but remained at higher than pre-attack levels a year later. We argue that this demonstrates a significant link between terror attacks and increases in hate crime and hypothesise that attitudinal changes resulting from media coverage may act as an underlying driver.
Introduction
A growing literature has studied empirical issues surrounding the economic and social effects of terrorism. Attempts have been made to quantify the effects of terrorism on a number of outcomes, including GDP (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Bloom, 2009) , financial markets (Chen and Siems, 2004) , social attitudes or well-being (Bozzoli and Mueller, 2009; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2004) , birth weight (Eskenazi, et al, 2007; Lauderdale, 2006; Smits et al., 2006) and mental health (Metcalfe, Powdthavee and Dolan, 2011) . Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence seems to suggest that the total effect on GDP and financial markets of a single terrorist incident is relatively short-lived, while the effects on well-being and health outcomes are large and persistent.
In this paper, we explore a different question, asking what happened to racially motivated hate crimes in the wake of the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the 9/11 terror attack that hit the US in September 2001. This is an interesting outcome to study if, for whatever reason, terror attacks alter individuals' perceptions of other groups in society. The paper empirically models the impact of terror attacks on hate crimes, in a setting with a credible research design where focus is placed on the impact on a particular sub-group of society. To do so, we investigate what happened to hate crime against Asians and Arabs in four regions of England after the 9/11 attack in the US in 2001 and the 7/7 attacks that hit London in 2005.
Whilst there is anecdotal and descriptive evidence of an increase in hate crimes against Muslims since the 9/11 terrorist attacks (which we review below), we are not aware of much quantitative research that tries to accurately pin down the impact of terror attacks on the incidence of hate crimes.
1 This is what we offer in this paper, where we analyse rich monthly administrative data before and after the terror attacks in four English police force areas with a significantly sized Asian/Arab (predominantly Muslim) population.
We quantify the increased number of hate crimes against UK Muslims that occurred as a result of both the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 bombings, using data that subdivides hate crimes by victim ethnicity. Thus, we can study hate crimes against Asians and Arabs before and after the attacks, and generate credible estimates by using hate crimes against Blacks and Whites as a control group.
One clear advantage of studying hate crimes as recorded by the English police is that they are explicitly defined and quantifiable. This therefore facilitates accurate study of time trends in a way which is not possible with the kind of opinion survey attitudinal, self-reported well-being or newspaper coverage data that have been more commonly studied in the terrorism literature. Moreover, actual hate crimes have greater implications -there is a direct cost to the victim, which may not be the case with attitudinal changes.
To preview our main findings, we report sizable increases in hate crimes against
Asians and Arabs -of the order of 25 to 30 percent -that occurred almost immediately in the wake of the two terror attacks. Moreover, whilst subsequently the increase did not stay as high as the initial impact, in both cases it persisted and was still significantly higher some time after the terrorist events occurred. In the case of the 7/7 attacks in Britain, where we have better data to estimate duration effects, cumulative increases remained significantly higher a year after the attacks.
causation between hate crime offences and terrorism, arguing strongly that hate crimes occur in response to terror attacks, but no evidence of causation working in the opposite direction where hate crimes would act as a precursor to terrorist activity.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we consider some theoretical background motivation of our questions of interest and discuss relevant existing evidence. In Section 3, we describe the data we use and offer some initial descriptive analysis. Section 4 explains the modelling approach and presents statistical estimates of the impact of the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks on hate crime. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Background and Existing Evidence

Hate Crimes in the Economics of Crime
Becker's seminal (1968) paper was the first to consider crime in an economic framework of rational behaviour. According to his theory, agents maximise utility by comparing the benefits of crime with the costs, where costs are the time and effort required plus the expected cost of deterrence efforts (i.e. cost of a police fine or incarceration multiplied by the probability of detection and prosecution). Thus, crime becomes a simple cost-benefit choice, and the model generates clear empirical predictions about incentive and deterrence effects on crime.
In the original Becker model, harm or loss to the individual is considered an externality, essentially an unintentional side effect of the offender's actions. In the case of a hate crime, however, it has been suggested that loss to the victim is the intention of the crime (Gale, Heath, and Ressler, 2002; Craig, 2002) . As well as causing harm to the victim, a hate crime is often intended to convey a message to the wider group to which the victim belongs (or is perceived to belong). Gale et al. (2002) (1999) . His model proposes that an individual gains utility from two sources; hate crimes and all other goods. The crucial assumption is that, while other goods can be purchased on the market, hate crimes must be 'created' using personal time and resources, and are therefore a more time-intensive consumption activity. As a result, an event which causes the individual to value his or her time more highly (for example, an increase in wages) results in substitution away from hate crime activities and towards market goods.
In both of these approaches, hate crimes can be viewed as a consumption good that generates utility, but at the same time incurs some kind of cost. In this setting, hate crimes could be driven by factors that alter preferences, for example if the propensity to commit hate crimes is affected by some kind of shock. One can ask what kinds of shocks may occur that could make an individual choose to dislike a hated group more or less at different times. At the micro level, this may be about personal experiences, education, culture and environmental changes. At the macro level, however, we might expect the biggest driver to be current affairs. So in the specific context of the hate crimes we study, namely those targeting Muslims, news events which some individuals may interpret as showing Muslims in an unfavourable light could be expected to increase the incidence of hate crime. We could plausibly consider the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks we study as featuring an extreme form of this media exposure.
Hate Crimes in a Behavioural Approach
So far, we discussed hate crimes within the economist's rational decision-making framework. When an individual decides to commit a hate crime, they do so because the expected utility from the action is positive. An alternative view is offered by contributions from behavioural economics. Particularly relevant are those areas which try to understand why agents make seemingly irrational decisions, even once factors such as limited information and limited decision-making time have been taken into account. It seems reasonable to think of hate crimes in this context in that, whilst the prospective gains from acquisitive crime are self-evident, the potential 'gains' from committing a pure act of violence against others are less clear (unless people have a taste for discrimination of this sort, though ultimately this is a theoretical proposition that is hard to test in practice). An alternative perspective might consider a hate crime to be an action of passion or emotion -where feelings of anger and rage dominate the individual's rational decision-making process. This is the assertion of Gordon and Arian (2001) who claim that "when one feels very threatened, the decision-making process is dominated by emotion rather than logic or rational considerations" (Gordon and Arion, 2001, page 197) . Indeed, unlike other types of violent crime, hate crimes tend to be committed by groups of people rather than individuals (see Craig, 2002) . This suggests there may be some element of group interaction, such as peer pressure or removal of social barriers, which causes individuals to commit hate crimes only when in groups. The concept of 'herding' is well known to economists, in particular in relation to financial markets. For example, economists explain the formation of stock market bubbles as being caused by investors valuing assets according to how they believe others to value assets rather than based on private valuations. This kind of group behaviour can lead to seemingly irrational choices and can cause instability in financial markets (Baddeley, 2010) . In the context of hate crime, we can imagine that group mentality has the power to overcome social taboos or persuade individuals to commit acts they would not otherwise have considered in order to impress the group. Escalation may occur when group members second guess the value that other members place on committing hate crimes.
How do these notions connect to terror attacks? It is evident that a terrorist attack can trigger sharp changes in behaviour, which may not be rational responses (see Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2003, or Sunstein, 2003) . However, the supposedly irrational 'certainty premia' phenomenon is accounted for in a rational framework developed by Becker and Rubinstein (2009) . They argue that, when considering shock mass-fear type events, the standard state-dependent utility model is not sufficient. In fact the model they develop assumes that a negative utility shock occurs only in a 'bad' state (like when the terrorist attack occurs), and not in good states.
Thus, there are both rational and behavioural arguments that have been proposed to explain why hate crimes occur. 4 In terms of empirical analysis, testing the distinction between the rational and behavioural arguments is not within the scope of this study 4 There is also a small body of work on connections between hate crime and economic variables that is indirectly relevant to this paper. This includes the empirical tests of their theories attempted by Gale at al (2002) and Medoff (1999) , together with research that studies economic responses to hate crimes (Gould and Klor, 2012 , look at the notion that immigrant assimilation slowed down in responses to 9/11) and the work on hate crimes and extremism in post-unification Germany (see, for example, Krueger and Pischke, 1997 , Falk et al, 2011 , or Siedler, 2006 .
(and it is indeed difficult to even start to begin thinking how this might be done).
Instead, the focus in what follows will be on empirically pinning down the magnitudes and durations of the effect of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks on subsequent patterns of hate crime incidence.
Existing Evidence Linking Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks
Quite a lot of descriptive evidence exists on whether terror attacks induce increases in hate crime. In the US it seems that the 9/11 terrorist attack caused an increase in the number of hate crimes against Muslims, Arabs, and those perceived to be Middle Eastern. 5 Consider the FBI annual statistics on hate crimes reported in Table 1 for 5 There is also some evidence that Sikhs were targeted, since the wearing of the turban was confused with the Arab headdress worn by Osama-bin-Laden and members of Al-Qaeda (Sheridan and Gillett, 2005) .
Other sources confirm this impression. Firstly, a report by the ADC (AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee) counts 700 violent attacks on US Muslims in the nine weeks following 9/11; they report that "the intensity of the backlash, especially in terms of hate crimes and discrimination, was at its peak in the first six months following the attacks, and particularly during the first nine weeks" (Ibish and Stewart, 2003, page 15 States, of which just one occurred in the ten days between 1 st September and 11 th September (the "baseline"). Of the remaining 99, 77 occurred in the period ten days after 9/11. Incident types ranged from assault and intimidation to murder and attempted murder. Although this survey is not a rigorous scientific study (the baseline period is so short, and may be subject to seasonal variation), it does support the hypothesis of a relatively short and intense 'shock period'. What is more, this study gives direct evidence that the perpetrators of these hate crimes were motivated by the terrorist event:
"the perpetrators in at least 30 of the incidents specifically mentioned the September 11 terrorist attacks, or accused the victims of being terrorists" (Swahn, Mahendra, and Paulozzi, 2003, page 188) .
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was not limited to the United States. Surveys of Muslims in both the UK and Australia find a significant increase in experiences of hate crime post 9/11. In the UK, Sheridan and Gillett (2005) Thus there is survey evidence that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were immediately followed by a dramatic rise in the incidence of hate crimes against American Muslims, with a peak lasting for around 2-3 months, and with the effects persisting for perhaps years afterwards. Other than the survey evidence already discussed, there exists little evidence of the experiences of British Muslims following 9/11. Even scarcer is evidence on the effect of 7/7, which we would presume likely to have caused similar effects to 9/11. Our empirical work will study the impact of both attacks.
Data and Descriptive Analysis
Data Data requirements to study the impact of terror attacks on hate crimes are stringent and adequate data to study the subject is hard to come by. This is for a number of reasons.
First of all, we need data on hate crimes measured in a consistent and accurate manner.
Second, we also need information on the ethnicity or religiosity of hate crime victims.
Fortunately, for our purposes, data collected on hate crimes and on the victims of hate crimes by police forces in England is of very good quality owing to stringent definitional guidelines that police forces need to follow (see the Appendix on the nature of crime recording practices in England City of London; the other three areas are independent of London (although, of course, the 7/7 bombers were from West Yorkshire).
We obtained monthly data from all four police forces, with information being supplied to us on the major offence category and ethnicity for both victims and offenders of all crimes listed as racially motivated. 8 For Leicestershire, London and the West Midlands we have data before and after both 9/11 and 7/7, and for West Yorkshire only for before and after 7/7.
Significant crime recording changes occurred in April 2002 (see the Appendix for more detail) and this constrains us in our ability to look at before/after changes in hate crime associated with the two terror attacks. In fact, it means the feasible time series we can study differ around the window of the two attacks. We can do a much better job on having consistent data before and after 7/7 and so our main focus is placed on studying what happened to hate crimes in response to this terror attack. We thus study the 7/7 attacks first and then look at 9/11 effects using a shorter time series that 
Hate Crimes by Victim Ethnicity
There is a distinction between racial and religious discrimination, although often the two co-occur. While it is clear that the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks triggered animosity towards Western Muslims, research from the US (discussed previously) has found that it is not just Muslims who were targeted -hate crimes were also carried out Since religious data was unavailable, we use ethnicity to define our main groups of interest. Ethnicity categories used in crime statistics differ from one police force to the next, and so some aggregation was required in order to standardise the figures from the different sources. The following six broad categories were created: Asian/Arab, White, Black, Oriental, Unknown, Other. The latter three contain very small numbers and so are dismissed from the analysis. We thus consider the impact of the terror attacks on Asian/Arab hate crimes and use hate crimes against Whites and Blacks as a control group in a difference-in-difference setting when we formulate our statistical models.
Descriptive Analysis
The vast majority of hate crimes involve violence against the person. Table 2 shows the major offence categories (excluding sexual offences) of all hate crimes against Asians/Arabs between January 1998 and March 2010 from our FOI request to the Metropolitan Police Service. Over three quarters (77 percent) were classified as violence against the person, and a further 18 percent involved criminal damage. suggesting an immediate impact. Second, eyeballing the graphs is suggestive of the notion that the time series patterns of hate crimes before the 7/7 bombings for all three ethnic groups look similar (this is considered formally in more detail below).
There are also two police force area specific observations that are relevant:
i) In the West Midlands there is a large spike caused by the Birmingham race riots that occurred in October 2005. The riots were sparked by the alleged rape of a Black girl by a group of South Asian men. This event seems to have been completely unrelated to the terrorist attacks that occurred three months previously.
ii) The pre-recording change data for West Yorkshire was not good enough to study the 9/11 attacks for this police force area. Also, they introduced a True Vision third party recording scheme was launched in June 2005, just one month before 7/7.
We deal with these two data issues in our empirical models below by including specific variables to control for any data jumps unrelated to our interest that result from these. to show a blip up in hate crimes against Asians/Arab 9/11 and higher relative levels (despite subsequent falls) compared to the White and Black hate crimes. We scrutinise these patterns in more detail by means of the statistical models described in the next Section of the paper.
Modelling Approach and Statistical Results
Basic Approach
We begin the statistical analysis by developing and empirical model that permits us to study the question of how the 7/7 and 9/11 terror attacks impacted upon hate crime. We ask what happened to hate crime against Asians and Arabs before and after the terror attacks relative to hate crime against two other ethnic groups (Blacks and Whites).
Because crime is seasonally highly persistent 9 , and our time units cover monthly data across years, we express our model in twelve month differences (thereby differencing out area and month fixed effects from a levels model 
where H denotes hate crimes, AA is a dummy variable indicating the Asian/Arab ethnic group (relative to Whites and Blacks), T is a dummy variable equal to one in months where the terror attack occurred (or for a window comprising several post-attack months -see below), X is the control variables for the data issues specific to particular police forces discussed above, τ is a time variable (see below) and ε an error term.
This equation enables us to ascertain the impact of terror attacks on hate crimes against the Asian and Arab group relative to the White and Black groups via the difference-in-difference estimate of θ. Estimates of θ reveal whether Asian/Arab hate crimes differentially increased when the terror attacks occurred and, when the attack indicator A t is defined to cover a longer post-attack duration, how they evolved subsequently in the wake of terror attacks. That there is a seasonal, monthly, aspect to this is revealed in the lower pane of 
Basic Differences-in-Differences
Pre-Attack Trends
Whilst the results of Table 3 show there to be a significant increase in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs relative to the control group immediately after the terror attacks, it remains the case that a prerequisite for our research approach to yield unbiased estimates is that pre-attack trends of hate crimes against the treatment group This is tested more formally in statistical terms for the 7/7 attacks in Table 4 .
The results in the Table show In all cases, the estimated coefficients on the trend variables show there to be no differential pre-attack trends between Asian/Arab hate crimes and those against Whites and Blacks. Thus, the common trends assumption required for our estimator to be valid appears to be upheld by the data. Table 5 shows D-i-D estimates for the case of the 7/7 attacks. There are four Panels in the Table, where Consider first the immediate impact results in Panel A of Table 4 . Specification
Statistical Estimates of the 7/7 Impact
(1) produces a 0.27 coefficient on the 7/7 dummy, showing a 27 percent significant spike up in hate crimes against Asians/Arabs in the attack month. Specification (2) shows a very similar estimated coefficient of 0.26 that remains strongly significant. This analysis based on the seasonally differenced data very much confirms the earlier, more descriptive analysis.
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Panel B considers impact in the three months following the terror attacks. The estimated impact comes down, but remains strong and significant at 0.21 to 0.23, depending on specification. The window is further widened in Panels C and D where the effects again fall but remain strongly significant. Six months on from the 7/7 attacks, the magnitude of the hate crime increase is around 17 percent and still around 10 to 15 percent after a year.
The results of Table 4 show a strong impact of 7/7 on hate crimes against Asians and Arabs. The immediate impact is largest, followed by subsequent decay, but the cumulative effect persists even twelve months after the attack occurred. Four specific estimates were chosen to be reported. We can, however, estimate an impact for every month sequentially to study the duration of impact in more detail. Estimated coefficients (and associated 95 percent confidence intervals) from carrying out this sequential modelling exercise are given in Figure 3 , which reports estimates for the year after the 7/7 attacks.
The estimates reproduce the large immediate impact at 27 percent in July 2005, which falls to 20 percent if the window is defined as four months after the attack. After that it stabilises in a range that stays over 10 percent higher. All of the individual estimates are significantly different from zero, as the lower confidence interval bars all lie above the zero line.
The results in Table 4 and Figure 3 are very supportive of the idea that 7/7 caused a strong immediate increase in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs, and that whilst the scale of the increase tempered off in the following months, it remained around 10 percent higher than the pre-attack levels. We are reluctant to extend the window much beyond a year, since other factors that could affect the relative hate crimes variable are likely to come into play and so confound the picture, but it does seem that the increase hate crimes against Asians and Arabs that occurred in the wake of the 7/7 bombings did persist for some time.
Separate Estimates by Police Force Area
In Table 6 we report separate estimates of the 7/7 impact, at the different chosen post-attack durations, by police force area. More specifically we consider London alone and the other three areas together. There are at least two reasons for doing this. First, as highlighted above, there are certain police force area specific data issues of relevance.
Second, we wish to explore possible heterogeneities in the magnitude and duration of impact across areas.
The Table confirms there to be some variation. In terms of immediate impact, it is higher at 0.32 in London, as compared to 0.18 in Leicestershire, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire. The rate of decay of the effects, however, is seen to differ by area with, interestingly, there being no impact remaining in London twelve months after the terror attacks, but the effects still persisting strongly in the other three police force areas.
One possible interpretation of the more heightened persistence outside of London is the presence of historically more entrenched race issues that have engendered deeper seated issues of anger and resentment in communities in the other areas. 12 The capital city has also been characterised by much more rapid population movements through migration over this time period as well, suggesting a more dynamic environment where perhaps faster adjustment can take place. Bagguley and Hussain (2008) . 13 See Jaitman and Machin (2013) for study of changing immigration patterns which are particularly marked in London during the 2000s. Despite the scale of change, they report no significant correlation between crime and immigration.
We have also estimated variants of equation (1) for the impact of 9/11.
However, we should say that this analysis is more limited than for the study of the 7/7
impact. There are several dimensions to this. First, as noted above, we only have usable data for three police force areas. Second, we are not able to define a symmetric time series window around the attack as we did with the 7/7 analysis. This is because we have to stop due to the recording practice change that occurred in April 2002. One consequence of this is we can only look as far as six months following the terror attack.
Third, because we only have two years' data, our ability to difference across months in the years is more limited.
The results are reported in Table 7 . The Table is structured in a comparable way to the 7/7 results, though we can only look at shorter duration effects. The column (1) results show a strong immediate impact effect from 9/11. Hate crimes against Asians and Arabs rose by 28 percent in September 2001. This effect dampens down by three months after the attacks to 22 percent, and falls further to 11 percent after six months, but remaining statistically different from zero. Figure 4 shows estimates for every month of the post-attack duration as with the earlier 7/7 analysis. Whilst it is only possible to study a shorter duration, a rather similar pattern emerges, with a strong positive initial impact which then dies down somewhat and appears to settle at a higher level than the pre-attack period.
Conclusions
Despite the importance of the subject, credible statistical evidence on the impact of terror attacks on hate crime is sparse and hard to come by. In this paper, we look at the impact of the 7/7 and 9/11 terrorist attacks on hate crimes against Asians and Arabs in four police force areas of the UK. We estimate a strong immediate impact on Asian/Arab hate crimes from both terror attacks, and find that whilst the effects do fall back again, they remain significantly higher than post-attack levels at least six months (in the case of 9/11) or a year later (in the case of 7/7). The highly similar pattern of results from the separate study of the respective impacts of 7/7 and 9/11 on hate crime in four areas with sizable Asian/Arab populations is highly suggestive that we can attribute a causal interpretation of the impact of terror attacks on hate crime from the empirical approach implemented in the paper.
The findings add to the literature on the economic and social effects of terror attacks. They show that, in line with some of the theoretical discussion in the early part of the paper, for individuals the cost of terror attacks is not just limited to the victims of the attacks. That hate crimes perpetrated against Asians and Arabs significantly rose in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 points to an additional social cost of terrorist activity.
Moreover, if attitudes towards groups like British Muslims are altered by attacks and by media coverage of attacks then these findings fit with the proposition of 'attitudinal shocks', where a driver of hate crimes is the level of hatred or bigotry about a particular group in society, which may well be influenced by media coverage of attacks.
In this setting, such shifts in underlying bigotry from attitudinal change following events like terrorist attacks seem to be potentially important determinants of hate crime incidence.
Thus, the determinants of hate crimes may be different from, or certainly more complex than, the kind of incentive effects or deterrence effects that emerge as crime determinants in the standard economics of crime model. Of course, to more firmly establish whether this is the case, continued work on the causes of hate crime and on the behavioural motives that individuals have to engage in crime against different ethnic or religious groups forms an important future research agenda. Notes: Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence interval from the specification in Table 7 . 
Local Changes in Recording Practices
In terms of local changes in recording practices, West Yorkshire adopted the NCRS in February 2002 and experienced the largest effect, with an estimated 47% NCRS impact on violence against the person for the year 2002/3. In addition, to the national recording changes, West Yorkshire also implemented some regional recording and reporting changes during the period studied. These were documented in the FOI response as follows: As a result we excluded West Yorkshire from the 9/11 analysis study period.
